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This paper analyzes the impact of consumer uncertainty on optimal ￿scal policy in a model with
capital. The consumers lack con￿dence about the probability model that characterizes the stochastic
environment and so apply a max-min operator to their optimization problem. An altruistic ￿scal
authority does not face this Knightian uncertainty. It is shown analytically that the government, in
responding to consumer uncertainty, no longer sets the expected capital tax rate exactly equal to zero,
as is the case in the full-con￿dence benchmark model. However, our numerical results indicate that
the government does not diverge far from this value. Even though the capital income tax rate is close
to zero in expectation, consumer uncertainty leads the altruistic government to implement a more
volatile capital tax rate across states. In doing so, the government relies more heavily on the capital
tax and, consequently, less heavily on the labor income tax to ￿nance the shock to public spending.
1 Introduction:
In the typical public ￿nance model with rational expectations, ￿scal policy in￿ uences consumer behavior
through two channels. First, policy can have a contemporaneous e⁄ect. By adjusting a labor income tax,
for example, the government alters the consumers￿incentives to supply labor in that period. The second
channel is through the consumers￿expectations. By committing to future policy, the government shapes
the consumers￿beliefs about the possible paths of the endogenous variables, such as asset returns and
the marginal utility of consumption. In doing so, future policies a⁄ect the consumers￿behavior in earlier
periods. The assumption of rational expectations helps facilitate this second, inter-temporal channel,
enabling the consumers to correctly forecast both the state-contingent values of the endogenous variables
and the probability model over these variables.
Rational expectations, though, might exaggerate the ability of consumers to understand the stochastic
equilibrium. This exaggeration could be costly in that it might mean that the typical ￿scal policy model
￿College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics and Accounting, One College Street, Worcester, MA 01610. E-mail:
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1overemphasizes how precisely consumers respond to future policy commitments of the government. If
instead consumers face uncertainty about the economy￿ s true probability model, their expectations and
behavior might be quite di⁄erent than those predicted in a rational expectations model. As a consequence,
the ￿scal authority might ￿nd it optimal to implement a di⁄erent set of ￿scal policies knowing that the
consumers face model uncertainty. Therefore, consumer uncertainty might lead to substantial changes in
both consumer behavior and optimal ￿scal policy relative to a rational expectations framework.
Karantounias, Hansen, and Sargent (2009) and Svec (2011) are two examples that introduce consumer
uncertainty in an optimal ￿scal policy model. In these models without capital, the authors show that the
consumers￿uncertainty does indeed alter the government￿ s policy decisions. This is because ￿scal policy
must mitigate the welfare costs associated with both linear taxes and consumer uncertainty. Depending
on the speci￿c type of altruism exhibited by the planner, the optimal policy involves either more or less
reliance on the labor income tax to ￿nance public spending than is optimal under the baseline model in
which consumers do not face model uncertainty.
Although these results are suggestive, the impact of consumer uncertainty on optimal ￿scal policy
should be most salient in a model with capital, as the consumers￿expectations are of primary importance
in the design of optimal policy. A prime example that highlights this importance in a rational expectations
model is Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994). In this model, consumers supply labor and can invest
in either capital or one-period, state-contingent government debt. A Ramsey planner sets a labor tax
and a capital income tax to maximize the consumers￿expected utility. As the authors show, the planner
￿nds it optimal to structure the state-contingent capital income tax rates so that the consumers expect
a zero percent capital income tax rate. This policy choice encourages the consumers to invest in capital
as they would in the ￿rst-best solution. Thus, in this rational expectations model, the government
forgoes collecting any tax revenue from capital income on average in order to impart the correct beliefs to
consumers.
But, if consumers were uncertain as to the economy￿ s true probability model and so behaved according
to a di⁄erent expectation, they might choose a di⁄erent investment pro￿le than would be optimal under
the assumption of rational expectations. Further, in responding to this uncertainty, the planner might
alter its policies in order to in￿ uence the consumers￿behavior under uncertainty. Consequently, the stark
and powerful policy prescription that the government should optimally implement an expected capital
tax rate equal to zero might break down under consumer uncertainty. For this reason, it is particularly
critical to understand the implications of consumer uncertainty in a ￿scal policy model with capital.
The current paper ￿lls this role by introducing consumer uncertainty into the neoclassical growth model
of Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994). To formalize this uncertainty and the consumers￿resulting
behavior, this paper follows Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2005, 2007) and the robust control literature.
2In this approach, consumers are unsure which probability model characterizes the economy. Instead,
they believe that the true probability model lies somewhere within a range of alternative probability
models. Each alternative model is represented as a martingale perturbing the approximating probability
model. With this type of uncertainty, the robust control literature assumes that the consumers optimize
according to max-min preferences, choosing the allocation that maximizes their expected utility, where
the expectation is taken with respect to the probability model that minimizes their expected utility. The
resulting allocation is labeled the robustly optimal allocation, and the worst-case probability model is
labeled the consumers￿subjective probability model. This behavior helps ensure that the consumers￿
utility never falls too far, regardless of which probability model happens to be correct.
Although it is assumed that the consumers are uncertain as to the correct probability model, the oppo-
site assumption is made for the ￿scal authority: the government is fully con￿dent that the approximating
probability model truly characterizes the stochastic environment. To be clear, the consumers and the
government are both endowed with the same approximating model. This approximating model speci￿es
the probability model associated with the exogenous and endogenous variables. However, the consumers
doubt the accuracy of this model, while the government trusts that it correctly describes the economy￿ s
probability model.
Critically, this con￿dence dichotomy reveals a number of possible objective functions for an altruistic
government. These objective functions di⁄er as to which expectation they use in calculating the con-
sumers￿expected utility. That is, the government could optimize with respect to the approximating
probability model or it could optimize according to any one of the alternative probability models that
the consumers believe could describe the economy, including the subjective probability model. As the
consumers distrust the government￿ s con￿dence in the approximating probability model, it is not clear
which model an altruistic government should use in its optimization problem.
Given this multiplicity of possible objective functions, I will assume in this paper that the ￿scal
authority maximizes the consumers￿expected utility under the consumers￿own subjective expectation.1
This choice of objective function allows for a one-step deviation from the rational expectations framework,
since both the consumers and the planner optimize with respect to the same expectation. Just as
important, the consumers would likely prefer this type of government because its objective function is better
aligned with their own preferences than one that optimized according to the approximating probability
model.
With this setup, the optimal policy implemented by the ￿scal authority involves one period of transition.
During that period, the government subsidizes labor with a negative tax on labor income and implements
1In a follow-up paper, I assume that the ￿scal authority maximizes the consumers￿expected utility under the approxi-
mating model.
3a large tax on capital income, as in Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994). From that period forward, there
are three main properties of the time-invariant optimal policies. First, it can be shown analytically that,
under one condition, the expected capital tax rate is non-zero, breaking the rational expectations result.
To derive the magnitude and direction of this deviation from zero, I turn to my numerical implementation
of the model. It is found quantitatively that the government chooses to subsidize the consumers￿capital
income, on average, at a modest rate. This subsidy is important in mitigating the pessimism associated
with consumer uncertainty.
Second, relative to the full-con￿dence benchmark, consumer uncertainty leads the government to in-
crease the covariance of both a private assets tax and the ex-post capital income tax with respect to public
spending. An implication of this increase is that the government relies more heavily on these capital
income taxes to ￿nance the deviation of spending from its mean. During periods of high spending, for
example, the government pays for the rise in expenditure largely through a combination of lowering the
return on public debt and raising the capital income tax rate. The third policy consequence of consumer
uncertainty is that the government should smoothe the ￿ uctuations in the labor income tax rate across
states. In fact, if consumers face a su¢ ciently high degree of uncertainty, the government implements a
constant labor tax across states.
The current paper ￿ts into a larger strand of the recent literature that analyzes how model uncertainty
alters the policy conclusions derived from rational expectations models. Generally, this literature has
focused on planner uncertainty within a monetary policy framework; examples include Dennis (2010),
Dennis, Leitemo, and Soderstrom (2009), Hansen and Sargent (2008), Leitemo and Soderstrom (2008),
Levin and Williams (2003), Onatski and Stock (2002), and Walsh (2004). Woodford (2010) modi￿es the
type of uncertainty considered by assuming that the central bank is uncertain of the expectations held by
￿rms, but not uncertain about the stochastic environment. Thus, in addition to examining ￿scal policy
rather than monetary policy, the current analysis di⁄ers from most of the literature by examining the
policy implications of consumer uncertainty rather than the planner￿ s uncertainty. Finally, this paper is
novel in that, to the best of my knowledge, it is the ￿rst to analyze optimal capital income tax rates in a
model with consumer uncertainty.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environment and characterizes
the type of uncertainty faced by the consumers. The optimization problem of the consumers is also
formulated. Section 3 discusses the planner￿ s optimization problem. In addition, this section includes
the analytical result that the ￿scal authority no longer sets the ex-ante capital income tax equal to zero.
Section 4 examines the numerical results, and Section 5 concludes.
42 The Economy:
Time is discrete in this in￿nite-horizon production economy. There are three types of agents: a govern-
ment, an in￿nite number of identical consumers, and ￿rms. The only source of randomness in the model
is a shock to government spending. This shock can take on a ￿nite number of values. Let gt = (g0;:::;gt)
represent the history of the spending shock up to and including period t, where the probability of each
history is ￿ (gt). In period 0, government spending is known to be g0 with probability 1. The government
￿nances this expenditure through either taxes or debt, bt. The government has access to a labor income
tax, ￿t, and a capital income tax, ￿t. Both are restricted to be proportional taxes. Government debt
has a state-contingent return, Rb;t, and matures in one period. The period budget constraint of the
government is
bt = Rb;tbt￿1 + gt ￿ ￿twtlt ￿ ￿t [rt ￿ ￿]kt￿1 (1)
Note that the capital income tax applies to the after-depreciation return on capital, where ￿ is the depre-
ciation rate.
Each consumer￿ s wealth is composed of three components: after-tax labor income, after-tax capital
income, and a return on debt held from the previous period. Out of this wealth, the consumer can choose
to consume, buy capital, or save in the debt market. In each period, the consumer also chooses how much
labor to supply. The period budget constraint for the consumer is
ct + kt + bt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)wtlt + Rk;tkt￿1 + Rb;tbt￿1 (2)
where Rk;t = 1 + (1 ￿ ￿t)(rt ￿ ￿) is the gross, after-tax return on capital.
A constant returns to scale production function, F (kt￿1;lt), transforms labor and capital into output.
This production function satis￿es the Inada conditions. The resulting output can be used for private
consumption ct, public consumption gt, or investment kt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt￿1. The economy-wide resource
constraint is therefore
ct + kt + gt = F (kt￿1;lt) + (1 ￿ ￿)kt￿1 (3)
Competitive ￿rms ensure that the returns on labor and capital equal their respective marginal products:
wt = Fl (kt￿1;lt) (4)
and
rt = Fk (kt￿1;lt) (5)
52.1 The Consumers￿Model Uncertainty:
The consumers are endowed with an approximating probability model that speci￿es a probability measure
over the paths of the exogenous and endogenous variables. Unlike in Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994),
the consumers are uncertain whether this approximating model correctly characterizes the equilibrium.
Instead, they worry that other probability measures could potentially describe the stochastic nature of
the economy. To ensure that these alternative models conform to some degree with the approximating
model, restrictions must be placed on what types of alternative models are allowed.
Following Hansen and Sargent (2005, 2006), it is assumed that each member of the set of alternative
probability distributions is absolutely continuous with respect to the approximating model. This require-
ment implies that the consumer only fears models that correctly put no weight on zero probability events.
That is, if ￿scal policy implies that a certain event will never occur, the consumers must also believe
that this is true. Thus, an alternative model can place a di⁄erent weight on a history relative to the
approximating model as long as the probability of that history under the approximating model is between
zero and one. More speci￿cally, the assumption placed on the alternative models is that they must be
absolutely continuous over ￿nite time intervals. This implies that the alternative models entertained by
the consumers cannot be rejected with a ￿nite amount of data, even though they could be rejected with
an in￿nite data set.
With the assumption of absolute continuity, the Radon-Nikodym Theorem indicates that there exists a
measurable function, Mt, such that the subjective expectation of a random variable, Xt, can be rewritten
in terms of the approximating probability model:
￿
E [Xt] = E [MtXt]
where E [Mt] = 1 and
￿
E is the subjective expectations operator. This is important, as it allows me to recast
consumer uncertainty. Earlier, the consumers were described as being uncertain about the probability
model that characterizes the paths of the exogenous and endogenous variables; now, the consumers can
be viewed as understanding the correct mapping from states of the world to equilibrium outcome, even
though they may not place the correct probability on each state.
By de￿ning an additional term, one can begin to measure the distance between an alternative proba-





and mt+1 = 1 otherwise. This incremental distortion must satisfy Etmt+1 = 1, implying that the
probability distortion Mt is a martingale. This restriction guarantees that the alternative probability
measures are legitimate probability models. With this de￿nition, the one-period distance between the
6alternative and approximating models is measured by relative entropy:
￿t (mt+1) ￿ Etmt+1 logmt+1
This measure is convex and grounded, attaining its minimum when mt+1 = 1;8gt+1.
Each period￿ s relative entropy can be aggregated and discounted to form a measure of the total dis-






This distance measure is used in the multiplier preferences of Hansen and Sargent (2006). The multiplier
preferences characterize how the consumers rank their allocations. Given these preferences, the consumers











Mt [u(ct;lt) + ￿￿￿t (mt+1)]
where u(c;l) is increasing in consumption, decreasing in labor, and strictly concave.
The coe¢ cient ￿ > 0 is a penalty parameter that indexes the degree to which consumers are uncertain
about the probability measure. A small ￿ implies that the consumers are not penalized too harshly for
distorting their probability model away from the approximating model. The min operator then yields
incremental probability distortions that diverge greatly from one. The resulting probabilities f￿ (gt)Mtg
are distant from the approximating model. Thus, a small ￿ indicates that consumers are very unsure
about the approximating model and so fear a large set of alternative models. A larger ￿ means that
the consumers face a sizable penalty for distorting their probability model away from the approximating
model. As a result, the min operator yields incremental distortions close to one, implying that the worst-
case alternative model is close to the approximating model. Thus, a large ￿ signi￿es that the consumers
have more con￿dence about the underlying measure and so fear only a small set of alternative models.
As ￿ ! 1, this model collapses to the rational expectations framework of Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe
(1994).
2.2 The Consumer￿ s Problem:
With this formalism, the consumer￿ s problem can be written recursively using the value function V (b￿;k￿;g;A):





> > > > > > > <




￿ (g0 j g)[m0V (b;k;g0;A0) + ￿m0 logm0]










> > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > ;
7where A represents the set of aggregate state variables that the consumers must track in order to forecast
￿scal policy in all histories. This set of state variables comes from the government￿ s optimization problem.
The consumer believes that her decisions cannot a⁄ect the movements of these aggregate state variables. In
addition to the period budget constraint, the consumer faces the legitimacy constraint,
X
g0
￿ (g0 j g)m0 = 1,
described above.
Solving the consumer￿ s Bellman equation for the robustly optimal allocation is a two-stage process. In
the inner minimization stage, the consumer fears that, for a given allocation, the worst-case probability
model over the government spending shocks will occur. The solution that results from this minimization
is the consumer￿ s subjective expectation. The outer maximization stage determines the allocation that
maximizes the consumers￿expected utility, taking into account the endogenous tilting of the consumers￿
expectation. The solution from this stage is the consumer￿ s robustly optimal allocation.
2.2.1 The Inner Minimization Stage:
As indicated above, the minimization stage yields the subjective probability model that minimizes the
consumer￿ s expected utility for a given allocation. The state-contingent probability distortion, which
balances the marginal bene￿t of lowering the consumer￿ s expected utility with the marginal cost of the
convex penalty term, solves the following equation:
V (b;k;g0;A0) + ￿(1 + logm0) ￿ ￿￿ = 0
















This equation describes the consumer￿ s worst-case, state-contingent incremental probability distortion.
The magnitude and direction of this distortion depend upon the consumer￿ s subjective welfare, V , in each
state in period t + 1. To better understand this function, consider a two-state government spending
process. Suppose that the equilibrium allocation yields a high subjective welfare in state A and a low
subjective welfare in state B. Plugging these values into (6), we see that mA < 1 and mB > 1. These
distortions imply that consumers fear that the likelihood of state A is small and that the likelihood of
state B is large relative to the approximating model.
The degree to which these multiplicative distortions diverge from unity depends upon ￿ and the dif-
ference between VH and VL. All else equal, a large ￿ decreases the probability distortion in all states
in period t + 1, meaning that fmt+1g remains closer to one. A small ￿, conversely, implies that the
8probability distortions are further away from one. Also, all else equal, as the di⁄erence between VH and
VL grows, the consumer￿ s alternative model is increasingly far from her approximating model.
2.2.2 The Outer Maximization Stage:
In the maximization stage, the consumer chooses an allocation that performs well even if the worst-case
shock process truly characterizes government spending. To ￿nd this allocation, I have incorporated the
subjective probability model that is derived in the minimization stage into the consumer￿ s optimization
problem. The resulting Bellman equation is



















This equation highlights the fact that the consumer does not weight her future welfare as she would if she
were fully con￿dent in the approximating probability model. Rather, the allocation alters the consumer￿ s
future subjective welfare, which in turn in￿ uences the endogenous probability distortion.
As is standard in ￿scal policy models in which the government must set linear taxes, the intra-temporal




= (1 ￿ ￿)w (7)
This equation links the marginal disutility of labor with the marginal bene￿t of raising consumption



















These equations balance the marginal utility of increasing consumption today with the expected marginal
utility from saving that additional unit in the debt or capital markets. Since the consumer faces model
uncertainty, the conditional expectation within these equations is taken with respect to the subjective
probability model.
The envelope conditions are
Vb (b￿;k￿;g;A) = ￿Rb
Vk (b￿;k￿;g;A) = ￿Rk
9De￿nition 1 Given an initial allocation fb￿1;k￿1g, an initial policy value ￿0, and an initial return on













1. The probability distortion solves the consumer￿ s inner minimization problem
2. The allocation solves the consumer￿ s outer maximization problem, and
3. The allocation is feasible, satisfying (3).
3 The Government￿ s Problem:
This section considers the policy problem of the government. It is assumed that the government has
access to a commitment technology with which it is able to bind itself to a sequence of policies chosen at
t = 0. Unlike the consumers, the government is fully con￿dent that the approximating probability model
accurately describes the government spending process.
As the de￿nition of the competitive equilibrium makes clear, there are a continuum of possible com-
petitive equilibria, each indexed by a ￿scal policy f￿t;￿tg
1
t=0. The outcome, then, depends upon the
objective of the ￿scal authority. For the purposes of this paper, I assume that the planner maximizes the
consumers expected utility under the consumers￿subjective probability model. This decision implies that
the government optimizes with respect to the same probability model as the consumers. Given that the
consumers are uncertain about the true probability model and the government has no more information
as to the true probability model than do the consumers (instead, the government is just more con￿dent
in the approximating model), the consumers might prefer this type of government to one that optimized
according to a di⁄erent probability model.
With this choice of planner preferences, the Ramsey outcome is the competitive equilibrium that
attains the maximum. In formulating the Ramsey problem, I will follow the primal approach in which
the government chooses the consumers￿allocation and probability distortions. With these values, I will
then back out what ￿scal policies implement this competitive equilibrium.









































fmt+1Vt+1 + ￿mt+1 lnmt+1g (12)
Mt+1 = mt+1Mt (13)
ct + gt + kt = F (kt￿1;lt;gt) + (1 ￿ ￿)kt￿1 (14)
Proof. When setting its policy, the government is restricted in the set of feasible allocations that it can
achieve by the competitive equilibrium constraints. The claim is that those restrictions are summarized
by the constraints (10) ￿ (14). To demonstrate this, I will ￿rst show that any allocation and probability
distortion that satis￿es the competitive equilibria constraints must also satisfy (10) ￿ (14). Multiply (2)
by ￿










reveals the constraint (10). The constraint (11) follows directly from the optimality condition in the inner
minimization, (13) comes from the de￿nition of mt+1, and (12) is the representative consumer￿ s Bellman
equation. Finally, (14) is the resource constraint which ensures feasibility. Thus, (10)￿(14) are necessary
conditions that the Ramsey outcome must solve. Going in the other direction, given an allocation and
distortions that satisfy (10)￿(14), policies and prices can be determined from (1)￿(5) and the consumer￿ s
￿rst order conditions.
The ￿rst constraint in the planner￿ s problem is the implementability constraint. This constraint di⁄ers
from its rational expectations counterpart in that the planner must account for the consumers￿probability
distortion at each date t. This is accomplished by the multiplicative term, Mt. In order to incorporate
how policy a⁄ects this distortion, the planner must keep track of how that distortion is set and how it is
updated across time and state. This information is contained in the next three constraints. The ￿nal
constraint is the resource constraint.
The proposition above describes the robustly optimal allocation and distortions that achieve the Ram-








t￿r￿ (gt j gr)Mt [uc (ct;lt)ct + ul (ct;lt)lt]
MrUc(cr;lr)
￿ kr (15)
11This value is pinned down using the future, state-contingent values of consumption, labor supply, capital,
and probability distortions.
It is known that the government has the incentive to ￿nance its public spending by raising taxes on
the inelastic goods of capital and debt at t = 0. To prevent this outcome, I assume exogenous values for
the initial capital tax, ￿0, and return on debt Rb;0.
3.1 Sequential Formulation of Ramsey Problem:











> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
Mtu(ct;lt) + ￿Mt [uc (ct;lt)ct + ul (ct;lt)lt]
+Mt￿t [ct + gt + kt ￿ F (kt￿1;lt;gt) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt￿1]
+Mt￿t
2
4Vt ￿ u(ct;lt) ￿ ￿
X
gt+1































> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ;
￿￿uc (c0;l0)[Rb0b￿1 + f1 + [1 ￿ ￿0][Fk (k￿1;l0;g0) ￿ ￿]gk￿1]
The ￿rst-order necessary conditions for t ￿ 1 are
ct : uc (ct;lt) + ￿ [ucc (ct;lt)ct + uc (ct;lt) + ucl (ct;lt)lt] + ￿t ￿ ￿tuc (ct;lt) = 0 (16)
lt : ul (ct;lt) + ￿ [ucl (ct;lt)ct + ull (ct;lt)lt + ul (ct;lt)] ￿ ￿tFl (kt￿1;lt;gt) ￿ ￿tul (ct;lt) = 0 (17)




















mt+1￿t+1 [Fk (kt;lt+1;gt+1) + 1 ￿ ￿] = 0 (19)






￿t+1mt+1 + ￿t = 0 (20)
mt+1 : ￿￿t [Vt+1 + ￿(1 + lnmt+1)] ￿ ￿t+1 + !t+1 = 0 (21)
The t = 0 ￿rst order conditions, which are functions of the initial levels of capital and debt, are detailed
in Appendix B.
There are two points worth noting about the set of optimality conditions. First, the ￿rst order condi-
tions, and consequently the robustly optimal allocation, do not depend upon the level of the probability
distortion, Mt. This result stems from the assumption that the government takes as its objective function
12the consumers￿subjective expected utility.2 Because the expectations of the two agents are aligned, the
government does not attempt to use its policy tools to re-align the consumers￿subjective expectation with
the approximating probability model. Rather, the government sets its taxes to induce the best path for
the allocation and probability distortions, taking as given the current level of consumer beliefs.
Second, (18) indicates that the multiplier ￿t is a martingale under the subjective expectation. That
is,
~
Et￿1￿t = ￿t￿1. A similar property is found in Svec (2011). This martingale a⁄ects the persistence of
the allocation. In the limit as ￿ ! 1, the multiplier becomes constant over time and across states.
3.1.1 Ramsey Policies and Prices:
The solution to the Ramsey problem yields the equilibrium allocation and probability distortions. The
bond holdings in each state, then, are given by (15). Given these values, this section describes the
policies and prices that implement the solution. That is, using the solutions that come from the Ramsey
problem, the goal of this section is to determine the prices fw;rg, bond returns fRbg, and taxes f￿;￿g
that decentralize the equilibrium. To accomplish this goal, I use the consumer￿ s budget constraint and
the ￿rst order conditions from the consumer￿ s and the ￿rm￿ s problems.
The prices on capital and labor follow directly from the competitive ￿rm￿ s marginal product conditions.
The labor tax rate can then be determined through the consumer￿ s intra-temporal condition:
￿t = 1 +
ul (ct;lt)
uc (ct;l)Fl (kt￿1;lt;gt)
Thus, the intra-temporal wedge is uniquely pinned down by the allocation.
The two remaining variables to ￿nd are Rb and ￿. The equations used to determine these values at






















Rk;t+1 = 1 + (1 ￿ ￿t+1)(rt+1 ￿ ￿)
and the t + 1 consumer￿ s budget constraint:
ct+1 + kt+1 + bt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t+1)wt+1lt+1 ￿ Rb;t+1bt ￿ Rk;t+1kt = 0 (22)
As this set of equations makes clear, there are more unknowns than equations. Consequently, this
model cannot separately identify Rb and ￿. To see this, suppose that there are N states of the world
2If, instead, the planner maximizes the expected utility of the consumers with respect to the approximating model, then
the allocation would be a function of the distortion, Mt.
13at time t + 1. This means that there are 2N variables that must be pinned down and only N + 2
equations. This indeterminacy is worsened by the fact that there is one additional linear dependency
among the constraints. This can be seen by multiplying (22) by ￿
X
gt+1
￿ (gt+1 j gt)mt+1uc (ct+1;lt+1) and
by summing the result over gt+1. The outcome is a function only of the allocation and distortions and
not Rb;t+1 or Rk;t+1. Thus, model uncertainty does not overturn the indeterminacy of the capital tax
rates and debt returns, as found by Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994).
An implication of this indeterminacy is that there are a number of di⁄erent economic environments
that would yield the same allocation. For example, if bond returns were assumed to be constant across
states, then the government could still set the capital tax rates in such a way as to implement the Ramsey
allocation. Conversely, if the government was unable to set state-contingent taxes on capital, then the
allocation is still attainable by correctly varying the state-contingent returns on debt. More generally,
any environment with an additional N ￿ 1 restrictions on capital taxes and debt returns would still lead
to the Ramsey allocation being implemented.
The logic behind this result is as follows. Consumers choose to save in the capital and debt markets
based on their subjective expectation of future returns in each of these markets. This means that the
consumer￿ s investment decision, for example, is a function of the weighted average of all capital returns at
t+1. The same idea holds true for the debt market. Then, to encourage the correct level of savings, the
government needs to focus only on the average returns to capital and government debt. This means that
the ￿scal authority has the ￿ exibility to design the state-contingent nature of these returns in a number
of ways, as long as the average returns on capital and debt are optimal and the consumer abides by her
budget constraint.
Because of this indeterminacy, the state-contingent capital tax rates and bond returns cannot be
separately identi￿ed. However, the theory pins down two policy variables related to these instruments.













￿ (gt+1 j gt)mt+1
uc(ct+1;lt+1)
uc(ct;lt) [Fk;t+1 ￿ ￿]
(23)
This ex-ante capital tax rate is the consumers￿subjective expectation of the t+1 capital tax rate, weighted









[Fk;t+1 + 1 ￿ ￿] ￿
1
￿
which is a function entirely of the allocation. Consequently, the ex-ante capital tax rate can be deter-
mined. This ex-ante value is di⁄erent from the version in Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994) in that the
14expectation is taken with respect to the subjective probability model, rather than with the approximating
model.
The second policy variable pinned down by the theory is labeled the private assets tax rate because
it combines information from both the ex-post capital tax rate and the return on government debt. To
derive this variable, suppose that the debt return in each state in period t + 1 is the combination of a
non-state-contingent return and a state-contingent tax rate:
Rb;t+1 = 1 +
￿
rt [1 ￿ ￿t+1]



















This constraint implies that
X
gt+1




With this decomposition, the non-state-contingent return on debt can be determined through (8).
From the government￿ s budget constraint, the total tax revenues from capital and debt in a particular
state gt+1











Finally, in order to turn this value into a rate and ease comparisons to the ex-ante capital tax rate, divide
by the total return across capital and bonds in each state. Then, the private assets tax rate is
￿t+1 =
￿t+1 [rt+1 ￿ ￿]kt + ￿t+1
￿
rtbt
[rt+1 ￿ ￿]kt +
￿
rtbt
Overall, this ￿scal policy model with capital pins down the wage, the rental rate of capital, and three
tax variables: a labor tax, the ex-ante capital tax, and a private assets tax. In order to determine the
speci￿c characteristics of these prices and policies, I will construct the recursive version of the planner￿ s
optimization problem and numerically solve it using value function iteration. But, before I follow this
procedure, there is one policy result that can be analytically derived by focusing attention on a speci￿c,
and simple, class of functions describing the consumers￿preferences. I highlight this implication in the
following section.
153.1.2 Ex-Ante Capital Tax Rate under Preference Restrictions:
A powerful ￿nding of Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994) is that, within a speci￿c class of utility functions,
the ex-ante capital tax rate is exactly equal to zero. However, one might fear that this policy conclusion
hinges upon the assumption that consumers have rational expectations. In this section, I re-examine
whether this theoretical implication still survives when consumers face model uncertainty.
For this section, assume that the utility function of the consumers is quasi-linear, where
u(c;l) = c + v (l)
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[Fk (kt;lt+1;gt+1) + 1 ￿ ￿]
where ￿t is the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint in period t. Combining these two equations




￿ (gt+1 j gt)mt+1
￿
￿t ￿ ￿t+1
￿t ￿ 1 ￿ ￿
￿
[Fk (kt;lt+1;gt+1) + 1 ￿ ￿] (24)
Proposition 2 8t > 1, if covt f(￿t ￿ ￿t+1);(Fk;t+1 + 1 ￿ ￿)g = 0 under the consumer￿ s subjective expec-
tation, then ￿e
t = 0. ￿e
t 6= 0 otherwise.
Proof. To see this, ￿rst note that ￿t is a martingale under the consumer￿ s subjective expectation, where
￿
Et￿t+1 = ￿t. Then, a property of covariance suggests that the numerator is equal to
￿
￿t ￿ 1 ￿ ￿
covt f(￿t ￿ ￿t+1);(Fk;t+1 + 1 ￿ ￿)g
It follows from (23) that ￿e
t = 0 only when covt f(￿t ￿ ￿t+1);(Fk;t+1 + 1 ￿ ￿)g = 0 and ￿e
t 6= 0 when this
condition does not hold.
This proposition provides a simple test to determine whether the value of the ex-ante capital income
tax rate is equal to 0 for a given value of ￿. In the limit as ￿ ! 1, the Lagrange multiplier ￿t is constant
across time ￿t = ￿;8t. This implies that the covariance is equal to zero and hence the ex-ante capital
tax rate is also equal to 0. This is the case examined by Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994). Outside
of this limit, though, the covariance is no longer equal to zero, meaning that the ex-ante capital tax rate
is also non-zero.
16Intuitively, this result stems from the fact that the planner must consider how its choice of capital
taxes a⁄ects the consumers￿incentive to save as well as their endogenous beliefs. This second desire can
be seen through the ￿rst term in the covariance: ￿t ￿ ￿t+1. This random variable tracks the shadow
value of the consumers￿welfare across states, which, in turn, re￿ ects the consumers￿probability distortion
across those same states. In balancing these two incentives, the government allows the shadow value of
the consumers￿welfare, ￿, to ￿ uctuate.








t = 0;8t ￿ 1. That is, if the planner places the same value on resources over time as the consumer,
then the ex-ante capital tax rate is equal to 0. This condition is satis￿ed in a rational expectations
model. However, when consumers face model uncertainty, the planner values resources di⁄erently than
the consumers. This is because the planner, when considering whether to allocate more consumption to
the consumers in one state, takes into account not just the consumers￿marginal utility gain from that
action, but also the e⁄ect that action has on the consumers￿probability distortion. It is this additional
marginal value that breaks the equality in (25). Thus, there is no theoretical presumption that the ex-ante
capital tax rate is equal to 0, even under quasi-linear preferences.3
3.2 Recursive Formulation of Ramsey Problem:
This section describes the recursive formulation of the planner￿ s problem. Government spending is now
assumed to follow a Markov process. The natural state vector is a function of both capital and govern-
ment spending. However, because of the forward-looking constraint on the movement of the consumers￿
subjective welfare, Vt, this problem is not time-consistent. As detailed by Marcet and Marimon (1998),
the addition of a co-state variable allows this constraint to be written recursively. The co-state variable,
￿, keeps track of the past promises made by the planner about the consumers￿subjective welfare.
The time 0 values of the capital stock, debt, and probability distortion imply that the period 0 problem
of the government is unlike the problem it faces in all other periods. To account for this di⁄erence, the
recursive formulation has to be separated into two. The ￿rst Bellman equation presented below applies to
the planner￿ s problem in any period t > 0, while the second one applies only to t = 0. When calculating
3Although I have written the proof assuming a quasi-linear form of consumer preferences, a similar argument can be made





The only di⁄erence is that (24) would contain the ratio
uc;t+1
uc;t in the expectation, which, in turn, would modify the covariance
term in the proof.
17the path of the economy over time, the values of the endogenous variables coming from the t = 0 problem
will be used as inputs into the t > 0 problem.
The planner￿ s value function, H (￿;￿) satis￿es the following Bellman equation:
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5 + ￿mgH (kg;￿g;g;￿)
9
> > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > ;
There are many points worth noting here. First, this Bellman equation is written from an ex-ante perspec-
tive. This formulation is necessary because of the presence of the incremental probability distortion. As
noted above, this distortion is a function of the characteristics across all states within the same time period.
In order to capture this, the Bellman equation must be expressed before the realization of uncertainty.
Thus, the subscript g denotes the state-contingent value of each random variable.
Second, the solution to this problem is indexed by the multiplier ￿. For a given ￿, the ￿rst order
conditions and additional constraints imply an optimal allocation. This allocation is used to construct
the implementability constraint, including the time 0 values of the allocation. If the implementability
constraint is satis￿ed with equality at that ￿, then the resulting allocation satis￿es all constraints and
yields the highest subjective welfare for the consumers. If the implementability constraint is slack, then
the algorithm will keep searching over ￿ until it ￿nds the solution.






> > > <
> > > :
u(c0;l0) + ￿ [uc (c0;l0)c0 + ul (c0;l0)l0] ￿ ￿uc (c0;l0)[Rb;0b￿1 + Rk;0k￿1]
+￿0 [c0 + g0 + k0 ￿ F (k￿1;l0;g0) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)k￿1]
+￿0 [V0 ￿ u(c0;l0)] + ￿H (k0;￿0;g0)
9
> > > =
> > > ;
where Rk;0 = 1 + (1 ￿ ￿0)(Fk (k￿1;l0;g0) ￿ ￿). The ￿rst order conditions for both of these recursive
problems are detailed in appendix C. There, they are veri￿ed to be equivalent to those derived in the
sequential formulation of the Ramsey problem.
4 Numerical Findings:
To numerically solve this model, I apply a value function iteration algorithm to the t > 0 Bellman equation
of the government. The state space is assumed to be bounded and rectangular. For an initial ￿, the
algorithm iterates until the value function has converged. Using this value function, I solve the t = 0
18recursive problem. The solution to this Bellman equation yields the initial values of the allocation, as
well as the values of the state variables that are inputted into the t > 0 Bellman equation. With these
values, I then construct the implementability constraint, assuming that the in￿nite time constraint can be
approximated by T periods. The program loops over ￿ until the implementability constraint is satis￿ed
with equality. At this value, the solution fully solves the planner￿ s problem.
Before getting to the numerical solutions, it is helpful to understand the logic of the rational expec-
tations model in order to better distinguish the implications of model uncertainty. When the consumers
have rational expectations, the benevolent planner must use its policy to mitigate the welfare costs as-
sociated one type of distortion: the assumed linearity of the taxes on capital and labor. These linear
taxes distort the savings and consumption / labor margins, respectively. In response to this distortion,
Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994) show that the government optimally sets the ex-ante capital tax
rate to 0. This choice leaves the savings margin undistorted. An implication of this result is that, on
average, the government does not use its tax on capital income to ￿nance government spending. Rather,
the government uses the labor tax to ful￿ll this goal. Although this leads to a large distortion in the
consumers￿consumption / labor decision, the government reduces the welfare cost of this distortion by
implementing a relatively smooth labor tax rate across states. Since government spending is volatile
while labor taxes are relatively smooth, the government ￿nances the shock to its spending through large
￿ uctuations in capital taxes and bond returns. Thus, the government lowers the costs of the distortion by
setting a fairly smooth labor tax and a volatile private assets tax, while maintaining an expected capital
tax rate equal to zero.
In addition to the linearity of the tax rates, model uncertainty adds an additional distortion to the
analysis. The consumers, in their uncertainty about the shock process, distort their subjective probability
model away from the approximating model. The resulting pessimism not only alters the consumers￿
decisions, but also reduces their subjective expected utility. This second point is due to the fact that
consumers place a smaller subjective probability on the high welfare state occurring and a greater subjective
probability on the low welfare state occurring. The government then must use its ￿scal policy to reduce
the welfare costs associated with both the linear taxes and consumer uncertainty.
To help elucidate the resulting optimal policy, I will graph the numerical solutions that come from
the value function iteration algorithm described above. In calculating these solutions, I assume that the
consumers￿preferences are described by
u(c;l) = (1 ￿ ￿)logc + ￿ log(1 ￿ l)
and the production function is of the form
F (k;l) = k￿l1￿￿










where ￿ is drawn from an approximation to a normal distribution, ￿~N
￿
0;￿2￿
. Depending on the value
of ￿, this process could resemble an iid shock to spending or an AR(1) process. For my numerical
calculations, I allow the shock to take three possible values. Then, to simplify the exposition, I choose to
plot only the two outside values of ￿. This decision is not costly, since the middle value of ￿ corresponds
with the middle value of V , which leads to essentially no probability distortion.
At this point, I make the following strong assumption: I assume that the approximating model hap-
pens to be correct. This assumption implies that the government￿ s con￿dence is well-placed, while the
consumers￿uncertainty is harmful. In fact, with this assumption, the consumers would have been better
o⁄ if they were more con￿dent in the approximating probability model.
The parameters assumed in the numerical simulations are
Utility and Technology Parameters Government Spending Parameters Initial Values
￿ 0.25
￿
g 0.2 Rb;0b￿1 0
￿ 0.98 ￿ 0 k￿1 2.5




In the following ￿gures, I graph the equilibrium solutions for many di⁄erent levels of consumer uncer-
tainty at a particular point in time. A large ￿ implies that the consumers are relatively con￿dent in the
approximating model. A small ￿ means that the consumers are uncertain about a large range of models
surrounding the approximating model. This latter case will lead the government to use its ￿scal policy
more aggressively in order to mitigate the welfare costs of uncertainty.
During the transition period, model uncertainty does not qualitatively change the optimal policies
implemented by the planner. The government sets a negative tax on labor income at t = 0, and the
ex-post tax on capital income is ￿xed exogenously. The ex-ante capital tax rate in period t = 0, ￿e
0,
is very large and on the order of 1000%. As consumers become increasingly uncertain, the government
raises ￿e
0 slightly. Just as in Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994), this expected tax is large because it is
a function of the initial capital stock, an inelastic variable.
Next, I turn to the policies implemented by the government after the initial period. As indicated
earlier, there are three policy variables pinned down by this model: the ex-ante capital tax, the labor tax,
and the private assets tax. Given that the most striking result in Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994) is
that the expected capital income tax rate equals zero for a speci￿c class of utility functions, I will present
this tax rate ￿rst.
20From the analytical section, we know that the government no longer sets the ex-ante capital tax rate
equal to zero after the initial period when faced with consumer uncertainty. The magnitude and the
direction of this deviation from zero is shown in Figure 1. As this ￿gure indicates, the government on
average chooses to subsidize capital income when facing consumer uncertainty. This action will, ceteris
paribus, encourage the consumers to increase their investment in capital and public debt. Notably, the size
of this optimal subsidy is relatively modest. With the chosen set of parameter values, the government￿ s
maximum subsidy is approximately 2%. Evidently, consumer uncertainty does not provide a signi￿cant
justi￿cation for allowing the ex-ante capital income tax rate to diverge far from zero.
In addition to the expected capital tax rate, two other policies were derived in the analytical section: a
labor income tax and a tax on private assets. These policies are plotted in Figure 2. There are two points
worth noting about the government￿ s choice of labor income taxes. First, the average labor tax is large
and positive across all levels of ￿: This fact implies that the government should obtain the majority of its
revenue from taxing labor, regardless of the level of consumer uncertanity. Second, consumer uncertainty
leads the government to reduce the degree to which the labor tax acts as a shock absorber for government
spending. To see this, note that the covariance between the labor tax rate and government spending falls
as ￿ falls, becoming negative for large enough values of consumer uncertainty. This negative covariance
reduces the degree to which the government can rely on labor tax revenues to ￿nance the deviation of
public spending from its mean.
The opposite conclusions are drawn from the graph depicting the private assets tax. This tax on capital
and debt is centered around zero, implying that the government collects little revenue, on average, from
the private assets tax. However, consumer uncertainty leads the government to increase the covariance
between the private assets tax and government spending. This policy suggests that the government should
rely more heavily on debt returns and capital taxes to ￿nance the deviation of spending from its mean
when consumers face model uncertainty.
A more direct method to examine the shock absorbing properties of the labor and private assets tax
is to answer the following question: assuming g = gh, how much of the increase in government spending
from its mean is ￿nanced using the labor and private assets tax? Given the information in the previous
￿gure, one would expect that the percentage of the shock ￿nanced through the labor tax (private assets
tax) falls (rises) with consumer uncertainty. The results, graphed in Figure 3, are consistent with this
belief.
The previous three ￿gures have plotted the ex-ante capital income tax rate, the labor income tax rate,
and the private assets tax rate. Each of these policy instruments were pinned down in the analytical
section above. The model, though, was unable to pin down the fourth policy instrument: the ex-post
capital income tax rate. To derive this variable, I must make the additional assumption that the return
21on public debt is non-state contingent. Making this additional assumption, I have plotted the state-
contingent ex-post capital tax rate in Figure 4. The pro￿le of the ex-post capital tax rate mirrors the
characteristics of the private assets tax. The ex-post capital income tax is not used to ￿nance the average
size of public spending, but rather is used to absorb the deviation of spending from its mean. This shock
absorbing property becomes increasingly relevant as consumer uncertainty rises.
In summary, there are three main policy implications of consumer uncertainty: ￿rst, the government
should subsidize capital income, though at a modest rate; second, the covariance of the labor income tax
with government spending should fall as the level of consumer uncertainty rises; and third, the covariance
of the private assets tax with government spending should rise with the level of consumer uncertainty.
Although these policy responses describe how the government optimally responds to consumer uncertainty,
they do not indicate why the government has chosen these responses. The next few paragraphs describe
the rationale behind the government￿ s decisions and provide supporting evidence for this interpretation.
Consumer uncertainty, as seen through the lens of this altruistic government, is costly because it induces
the consumers to behave in a pessimistic fashion. This pessimism makes the consumers reluctant to save
in capital or public debt because they worry that the true probability model is one that yields a low rate of
return on these investments. The resulting reduction in savings is detrimental for two reasons. First, the
fall in savings reduces the economy￿ s capital stock. This, in turn, decreases key macroeconomic variables
like output, wages, and consumption. Second, if the consumers save less, it becomes more di¢ cult for the
government to ￿nance its spending shock. Because of both of these costs, the government must use its
policy instruments to increase how much consumers invest in capital and public debt.
One key ￿scal instrument that in￿ uences the consumers￿savings decisions is the private assets tax. If
the government wants to raise the level of consumer savings in both capital and public debt, the government
should reduce the expected value of the private assets tax. This reduction would increase the after-tax
return on these assets, thus inducing consumers to invest more in capital and debt. As Figure 5 shows, this
is exactly how the government responds to consumer uncertainty. Speci￿cally, as consumer uncertainty
rises, the government reduces the average value of the private assets tax across states.4
This policy decision, though, comes with a cost: by choosing to subsidize savings, the government
must obtain more tax revenue from another source in order to ￿nance its spending. In this case, the
government o⁄sets the subsidies by increasing the average labor income tax rate, as seen in Figure 6.
Comparing Figures 5 and 6, we can see that, as consumer uncertainty rises, the government both increases
the subsidy on private assets and the average labor tax rate. This increase in the average labor tax is
4I use the average value of the private assets tax rather than the expected value because the former isolates the impact of
consumer uncertainty on the tax rates. That is, the average value is useful because it doesn￿ t combine information on both
the tax rates and the stochastic discount factor. Later in this discussion, I describe how the movement in the stochastic
discount factor is consistent with the movement in the tax rates.
22bene￿cial in that it allows the government to subsidize savings. But, it is costly in that it further distorts
the consumption - leisure tradeo⁄away from the ￿rst-best. As the average labor tax grows, the distortion
becomes increasingly harmful to the consumers￿welfare. Interestingly, it is this rising welfare cost that
leads the government to ￿nd a second method of encouraging consumers to save without resorting to
raising the subsidy on capital income.
This second method ￿one that induces the consumers to save more without requiring a higher average
labor income tax ￿involves using policy to manipulate the consumers￿subjective probability model. In
particular, the government reduces the covariance between the labor income tax and government spending,
as shown in Figure 2. This policy reduces the size of the welfare gap V (gL) ￿ V (gH), which can be seen
in Figure 7. This change in the consumers￿welfare pro￿le is important because it leads the consumers
to decrease (increase) the subjective weight they place on the high (low) spending state, relative to the
weights the consumers would otherwise place on the two states. That is, because the high spending state is
no longer associated with a large reduction in welfare, the consumers need not fear this state as much, and
as such, m(gH) falls. The converse holds true for the low spending state. In Figure 8, I provide evidence
of these subjective probability movements by plotting the consumers￿subjective probability distortion.
In that ￿gure, I compare the consumers￿probability distortion under the optimal policy and under a
counterfactual scenario. In the counterfactual scenario, I assume that, for all levels of ￿, the government
maintains the same gap in the consumers￿subjective welfare as is optimal when ￿ ! 1. This comparison
is necessary to show that the state-contingent probability distortions are smaller than they would be under
an alternative (non-optimal) policy.
Upon noting that the high (low) government spending state is associated with a large and positive
(large and negative) ex-post capital income tax, we see the bene￿t of the government￿ s policy: by inducing
the consumers to lower (raise) their subjective weight on gH (gL), the government e⁄ectively lowers the
expected value of the capital income tax without modifying the underlying state-contingent capital income
taxes. With this knowledge, we can now re-analyze Figure 1. That ￿gure shows that the government
lowers the ex-ante capital income tax rate as consumer uncertainty increases. In fact, the fall in the
ex-ante capital income tax depicted in Figure 1 is the product of two policies. The ￿rst policy is that
the government directly lowers the average level of the private assets tax, and by extension, the capital
income tax rate. The second policy is that the government modi￿es the state-contingent pro￿le of labor
taxes to induce the consumers into believing that the state associated with the low capital income tax is
relatively more likely than the state associated with the high caiptal income tax.
In conclusion, the numerical results suggest that the government responds to consumer uncertainty
by encouraging the consumers to increase their savings in capital and public debt. The government
accomplishes this by directly lowering the tax on private assets and by manipulating the consumers￿
23expectations.
Until now, I have described how consumer uncertainty a⁄ects optimal ￿scal policy and the consumers￿
allocation at a particular point in time. Now, I change my focus in order to highlight the impact of
uncertainty on the time series properties of policy and the allocation. Speci￿cally, Figure 8 plots how key
economic variables respond to a one-period increase in government spending. To help clarify the impact
of uncertainty on the impulse response functions, I have drawn two lines for each graph in Figure 8. The
solid line displays the baseline scenario in which the consumers face no uncertainty, while the dotted line
displays the numerical solutions when consumers face a substantial amount of model uncertainty. By
comparing these two lines, we can determine how uncertainty a⁄ects the equilibrium.
The top left graph plots the shock to government spending. With this one-period increase in spending,
the government lowers the labor income tax relative to the baseline model. This fall leads to an increase
in the consumers￿labor supply, which increases the economy￿ s output. In addition, the fall in the labor
tax rate lowers both the wage and the labor tax revenues. We can also see that the labor income tax
rate remains persistently lower than the tax rate in the baseline model. This leads to persistently higher
values of labor supply and output.
The welfare implications of this ￿scal policy model depend on the assumed spending shock process. In
this paper, I have assumed that the true government spending process happens to be the approximating
model, implying that the government￿ s con￿dence is well-placed. Model uncertainty, then, is harmful to
the consumers, since they are guarding against alternative probability models that turn out to be incorrect.
This loss in welfare can be seen in Figure 9, which plots the consumers￿subjective welfare as a function of
their model uncertainty. The consumers￿subjective welfare falls as ￿ falls, and then only moves upward
when policy is used so aggressively that the consumers weight the high government spending state less
highly than the low spending state.
5 Conclusion:
This paper examines how consumer uncertainty a⁄ects the optimal policies implemented by a ￿scal au-
thority in a model with capital. Unlike in a rational expectations framework, consumers lack con￿dence
about the equilibrium probability model. Wanting to be robust against this uncertainty, they apply a
max-min operator to their decision problems. That is, the consumers choose the allocation that maximizes
their expected utility, where the expectation is taken with respect to their subjective probability model.
Additionally, it is assumed that the government is fully con￿dent that the approximating model correctly
characterizes the stochastic environment.
This con￿dence dichotomy implies that an altuistic government could have one of a number of possible
24objective functions. In this analysis, it is assumed that the government maximizes the consumers￿expected
utility under their own subjective probability model. This assumption aligns the expectations of the two
agents. Given these preferences, the government seeks to use its ￿scal policy to mitigate the welfare
costs associated with both the assumed linearity in the tax rates and consumer uncertainty. It is shown
analytically that, under one condition, the government no longer implements a zero ex-ante capital tax
rate. This is because the government takes into account how the consumers￿allocation a⁄ects their
probability distortion.
The numerical implementation of this model shows that the optimal ex-ante capital tax rate is a modest
subsidy on the order of 2%. To ￿nance this subsidy, the government raises the average value of the
labor income tax. Further, the numerical results suggest that, relative to the full-con￿dence benchmark
model, the government increases the covariance of the private assets tax and lowers the covariance of
the labor income tax with respect to government spending. In doing so, the government manipulates
the consumers￿subjective expectation, making them believe that the subsidy is relatively large. These
policies encourage the consumers to invest more in both capital and public debt, which helps counter the
consumers￿pessimistic response to uncertainty.
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277 Appendix A:
In this appendix, I characterize and solve the Ramsey problem of a government that maximizes the
consumers￿expected utility under the approximating model. In order to simplify the formulation, let
W (ct;lt;Mt;￿) ￿ u(ct;lt) + ￿Mt [uc (ct;lt)ct + ul (ct;lt)lt]
This term combines the consumers￿period utility function with the implementability constraint. With











> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
W (ct;lt;Mt;￿)
+￿t [ct + gt + kt ￿ F (kt￿1;lt;gt) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt￿1]
+￿t
2
4Vt ￿ u(ct;lt) ￿ ￿
X
gt+1































> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ;
￿￿uc (c0;l0)[Rb0b￿1 + f1 + [1 ￿ ￿0][Fk (k￿1;l0;g0) ￿ ￿]gk￿1]
The ￿rst-order necessary conditions for t ￿ 1 are
ct : Wc (ct;lt;Mt;￿) + ￿t ￿ ￿tuc (ct;lt) = 0
lt : Wl (ct;lt;Mt;￿) ￿ ￿tFl (kt￿1;lt;gt) ￿ ￿tul (ct;lt) = 0






















￿t+1 [Fk (kt;lt+1;gt+1) + 1 ￿ ￿] = 0







mt+1 : ￿￿t [Vt+1 + ￿(1 + lnmt+1)] ￿ ￿t+1Mt + !t+1 = 0
The ￿rst order condition with respect to Vt indicates that the multiplier ￿t is a martingale under the
approximating model: Et￿1￿t = ￿t￿1. This martingale a⁄ects the persistence of the allocation. In the
limit as ￿ ! 1, this martingale condenses to a constant.
The ￿rst order conditions also suggest that the allocation is a function of the consumers￿probability
distortion, Mt. This result is due to the misalignment of the government￿ s expectation and the consumers.
That is, the government incorporates the approximating model into its objective function, even though
the consumers behave as if this approximating model is not correct. This misalignment implies that the
28planner must keep track of how the chosen allocation a⁄ects the probability distribution of the consumers.
This is accomplished through the term Mt. An implication of this is that Mt is a state variable in the
recursive problem of the government.
The recursive problem of the government is






￿ (g j g￿)
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
W (cg;lg;Mg;￿) + ￿g [cg + g + kg ￿ F (k￿;lg;g) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)k￿]
￿￿￿ [mgVg + ￿mg lnmg] + ￿g [Vg ￿ u(cg;lg)]





















> > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > ;
where W (cg;lg;Mg;￿) ￿ u(cg;lg) + ￿Mg [uc (cg;lg)cg + ul (cg;lg)lg]
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The t = 0 ￿rst order conditions for a government that maximizes the consumers￿expected utility under
the distorted probability model are
c0 : 0 = uc (c0;l0) + ￿ [ucc (c0;l0)c0 + uc (c0;l0) + ucl (c0;l0)lt]0 + ￿0 ￿ ￿0uc (c0;l0)
￿￿ucc (c0;l0)[Rb0b￿1 + Rk0k￿1]
l0 : 0 = ul (c0;l0) + ￿ [ucl (c0;l0)c0 + ull (c0;l0)l0 + ul (c0;l0)] ￿ ￿0Fl (k￿1;l0;g0) ￿ ￿0ul (c0;l0)
￿￿ucl (c0;l0)[Rb0b￿1 + Rk0k￿1] ￿ ￿uc (c0;l0)(1 ￿ ￿0)Flk (k￿1;l0;g0)
Vt : 0 = ￿0
k0 : 0 = ￿0 ￿
X
g1
￿￿ (g1 j g0)m1￿1 [Fk (k0;l1;g1) + 1 ￿ ￿]
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The ￿rst order conditions from the recursive formulation of the planner￿ s problem are
cg : 0 = uc (cg;lg) + ￿ [ucc (cg;lg)cg + uc (cg;lg) + ucl (cg;lg)lg] + ￿g ￿ ￿guc (cg;lg)
lg : 0 = ul (cg;lg) + ￿ [ucl (cg;lg)cg + ul (cg;lg) + ull (cg;lg)lg] ￿ ￿gFl (k￿;lg;g) ￿ ￿gul (cg;lg)
kg : 0 = ￿g + ￿Hk (kg;￿g;g;￿)








￿ (g j g￿)mg!g
#
mg : 0 = u(cg;lg) + ￿ [uc (cg;lg)cg + ul (cg;lg)lg] ￿ ￿￿ [Vg + ￿(1 + lnmg)]
+￿g [Vg ￿ u(cg;lg)] + $g + ￿H (kg;￿g;g;￿)
￿g : 0 = Vg ￿ u(cg;lg) + ￿H￿ (kg;￿g;g;￿)
The envelope conditions are
Hk (k￿;￿￿;g￿;￿) = ￿
X
g
￿ (g j g￿)￿gmg [Fk (k￿;lg;g) + 1 ￿ ￿]
H￿ (k￿;￿￿;g￿;￿) = ￿
X
g
￿ (g j g￿)[mgVg + ￿mg lnmg]
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Figure 1: Ex ante capital tax rate, t≥1, across different levels of consumer uncertainty 
    
Figure 2: Labor income and private assets taxes across different levels of consumer uncertainty 
    
Figure 3: Percentage of an increase in government spending financed through labor and private 
assets taxes across different levels of consumer uncertainty 
    
Figure 4: Ex post capital tax assuming non state contingent debt returns across different levels of 
consumer uncertainty 
    
Figure 5: The average value of the private assets tax across different levels of consumer 
uncertainty 
    
Figure 6: The average value of the labor income tax across different levels of consumer 
uncertainty 
    
Figure 7: The consumers’ subjective welfare profile across different levels of consumer 
uncertainty 
    
Figure 8: The consumers’ actual subjective probability weights, m’, and the subjective 
probability weights under the counterfactual scenario in which the profile of V remains the same 
as under rational expectations 
    
Figure 9: The impulse response functions for a one period increase in government spending 
    
Figure 10: The consumers’ subjective welfare at t=0 across different levels of consumer 
uncertainty 